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Abstract
Research on ‘happiness’ suggests that once an average per capita income of around
US$10,000 is achieved in a country, further increases in income will not lead to a
significant increase in happiness. Additional income will probably often be spent on the
satisfaction of mainly ‘relative’ needs, of which ‘status goods’ would be one example.
From that perspective, an overall shift to more fuel-efficient cars (i.e. smaller cars with
less power) would not necessarily, or only to a limited extent, result in less happiness.
From a welfare economic perspective, the satisfaction of the relative needs pertaining to
consumption can be considered as a form of consumption externalities. This creates a
welfare economic basis for government intervention. A model in which these consumption
externalities are studied is presented here. Government intervention would include
stimulating consumption of lower-status goods and discouraging consumption of higher-
status ones. We speculate, however, that to achieve a significant increase in the fuel
efficiency of a country’s car fleet through pricing policies, huge price increases may
often be needed. As acceptance of price increases as a policy instrument is often low,
“fee-bates” and tradeable permits may be more preferable instruments.
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1. Introduction
Climate change has a prominent position on the research and policy agenda in many
countries. CO2 is the most important greenhouse gas. In many western countries
transport has a share in CO2 emissions of around 20%. In almost all western countries
the CO2 emission of transport is increasing, whereas according to the Kyoto protocol
greenhouse gas emission will have to be reduced in the next decades.
Several researchers have suggested that the transport sector is not the first candidate
sector for introducing measures to reduce CO2 emissions (see for a discussion on this
subject, for example, Peake, 1997). The most often mentioned reasons are the
relatively poor cost-effectiveness of technical measures for cars and other vehicles,
and the relatively low price elasticity. Besides, levies on road fuels are relatively high
and further increases would reduce the consumers’ surplus of car use.
It is questionable if technical measures in transport have a poor cost-effectiveness.
Decicco and Ross (1996) found that many available technologies in the USA for
improving fuel efficiency of cars are not (yet) applied to cars, and have a pay-back
period much shorter than the lifetime of the average car. From the private car owner’s
perspective, many options will pay themselves back within three years, assuming a
discount rate of 13%. Their middle estimate is that car fuel efficiency can be improved
by 65 % for US$ 770 per car, corresponding with a cost level of only $0.53 per
gallon (prices of 1993, assuming a discount rate of 5% and assuming that a car will be
driven for 12 years). On the other hand, Plotkin and Greene (1997) conclude that cars
could be about 60% more fuel efficient (4.4 l /100 km vs. 7 l /100 km), with an
increase in the price of US$ 1500. Plotkin and Greene do not consider this as an
attractive option. The dominant reason for differences between studies is the
disagreement in costs of fuel economy technologies (Greene and Decicco, 2000).
Besides, studies on fuel economy technologies generally do not assume declining
costs with cumulative production, due to learning and scale effects (Greene and
DeCicco, 2000), whereas these declines have been observed in the past (Adler and
Clark, 1991). In most European countries fuel prices are much higher than in the
USA. Therefore additional fuel economy technologies might be more attractive for
the consumer than in the USA, despite the somewhat lower annual number of
kilometers driven per car in European countries compared to the USA.
Data from several western-European countries show that the fuel efficiency of the car
fleet has not improved in the last few Years (Sweden, Italy), while in other countries
the improvement continues, but at a much lower speed than up to the late eighties
(UK, Denmark) (Davis, 1997; Schipper and Marie-Liliu, 1998). For instance, since
1990 the fuel efficiency of the Dutch car fleet has remained almost constant: the
increase in fuel efficiency due to technical improvements has been compensated by an
increase in power and weight. The increase in weight is almost completely the result
of an upgrading of what manufacturers call the same car type (e.g. Volkswagen Golf):
the 1999 Golf is a more up-market model than the first Golf model (Van den Brink
2and Van Wee, 1999). The current Polo (type positioned below the Golf) offers even
more space and performs better than the Golf Mk 1 (1974-1983). Probably, the
changes in the supply of cars (upgrading) has influenced demand, and vice versa. The
relatively constant fuel efficiency of the car fleet, however, contradicts Dutch
government policy: in 2010, CO2 emissions of cars will probably be higher than in
1986, whereas the government is striving for a reduction in CO2 emissions (RIVM,
1997).
In this paper, we focus on the consequences of a shift towards more fuel-efficient cars
for the ‘happiness’ or well-being of people. The question we study is whether a shift
towards more fuel-efficient cars would lead to a decrease in happiness, and if so, to
what extent. We use the results of research on happiness, and welfare economic
theory to study this question.
2. Research on happiness: the relationship between income and happiness
Research on happiness has been carried out by a relatively small group of researchers.
The central issues or questions are ‘how happy are people?’ and ‘which factors
influence happiness?’. Researches measure the level of happiness by asking people
how happy they consider themselves. One of the explanatory factors normally
considered is income (and including distributions). These questions have been studied
primarily by sociologists. Nevertheless, economists too have recently focused on this
subject (Jol and Otten, 1997; Kooreman, 1998; Veenhoven and Timmermans, 1998).
An important distinction is made between comparisons within and between countries.
Some researchers have concluded that in a country people with higher incomes are
happier than people with lower incomes (Plug, 1997; Jol and Otten, 1997). Others did
not find this relationship (Veenhoven and Timmermans, 1998). It seems that within a
country, the influence of income on happiness is limited, but possibly significant.
Studies comparing happiness between countries lead to different conclusions.
Easterlin (1973, 1974) concludes that an increase in average income per capita does
not (significantly) increase happiness. Veenhoven (1989) concludes Easterlin’s
analyses to be misleading. Using the same data Veenhoven concludes that an increase
in average income leads to an increase in happiness, but the increase of happiness
diminishes as incomes increase. From a certain level onwards, called the saturation
level, an increase in the average income does not seem to lead to a further increase in
happiness at all. Veenhoven and Timmermans (1998) conclude that the saturation
yearly income level is at about US$10,000 per capita. This conclusion is consistent
with time-series data of western countries. Since 1945 US average incomes have
more than tripled but the level of happiness has remained constant. Since 1970 in the
Netherlands the average level of happiness has remained constant but incomes have
increased significantly (Veenhoven and Timmermans, 1998). Kooreman (1998) also
concludes that once a certain saturation level is achieved (‘once the first needs are
fulfilled’) a further increase in average per capita income does not increase happiness.
Veenhoven (1996) concludes that factors that do influence happiness are related to
‘certainty of existence’ (social security, physical safety and legal certainty/security),
3freedom (political freedom, freedom to live one’s own life), the cultural climate
(education, level of information, value orientation, participation in
societies/associations and modernism (people in modern societies are happier than
people in traditional societies).
The literature on happiness suggests therefore that in high-income countries, a further
increase in average incomes either does not, or hardly, results in an increased level of
happiness.
3. Absolute and relative needs
In economic and sociological literature different levels of needs are sometimes used
(e.g. Maslow, 1943; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Two extremes would be goods
that satisfy ‘purely absolute’ versus ‘purely relative’ needs. In reality, such a clear
distinction can probably not be made, and goods may be positioned on a continuous
scale to reflect to the ‘degree of absoluteness’ of needs they fulfill. Nearly absolute
needs would be needs like food, clothes and a (basic) dwelling. Relative needs are the
result of the desire to distinguish oneself from other people – or, the opposite, to
identify oneself with others. Focussing on the former possibility: people are willing to
pay more for expensive (makes of) clothes from certain manufacturers, because of the
status attached to these clothes. Buying a high performance, luxurious car instead of a
cheaper one is probably also often more related to status than to transport needs.
As the scale implies, the distinction between absolute and relative needs is not sharp.
A very basic dwelling is an absolute need, but a little more than a basic dwelling is
probably still an absolute need. The difference between a spacious, comfortable house
and a very luxurious one is relative, so will probably satisfy mainly relative needs.
Food is a primary need, but caviar instead of chicken is not. For the distinction
between absolute and relative needs, time and space are relevant. Among the very
first people that bought a car were probably many that were fulfilling relative needs
(see Sachs, 1984; Bierbaum, 1903; Tengström, 1993). Today the car fulfils an
absolute need for transport of many people: without a car people would be ‘disabled’,
from a mobility point of view, unless they changed their home location or jobs and/or
adapted to the public transport system or the bicycle. Car ownership in remote rural
areas is probably more related to absolute needs than in the centre of London, Paris or
Amsterdam. At the same time, however, the choice of a specific brand or type may
often reflect the desire to fulfill relative needs, as will be substantiated below. In
particular, we suspect that one of the important charms of a car with a large engine
would be the possibility to accelerate faster than others at traffic lights. Leaving
others behind (a clear example of a relative need) might be a more important reason
to buy such cars than the pure time gain enjoyed from such faster acceleration (which
is closer to an absolute need).
44. Social comparison and vehicle choice
On the basis of the foregoing, it may be inferred that beyond a certain income level,
additional average income does not lead to an increase in average happiness; this is
because (nearly) all extra income is spent on relative needs. Anecdotal evidence
strongly suggests that this may be the case for cars. Many people are prepared to pay
for extra power, expensive accessories like alloy wheels and a bigger car. Although a
bigger car might have practical advantages and be more comfortable it is questionable
if people are prepared to pay the additional money for a big, powerful and expensive
car if status aspects did not exist. The engine choice might also be influenced by a
comparison with other cars. Although accelerating rapidly might be an independent
joy factor, the acceleration capacities of other cars probably function as a reference.
Thirty years ago, acceleration from zero to 100 km/h in 10 seconds was almost like
magic; only expensive sports cars had this capacity. Today, several middle-class cars
with more than average power can accelerate that rapidly. Probably the joy of
acceleration depends on the possibilities of the rest of the car fleet.
This anecdotal evidence is supported by literature from psychological sciences (Steg
et al., 1998; Diekstra and Kroon, 1997). For instance, Steg et al. (1998) distinguish
instrumental and social comparison motives for car use and car ownership.
Instrumental motives refer to the effectiveness, (in)convenience and (dis)comfort of
car use. This especially concerns the cognitive-rational, more or less objective and
easily measurable consequences of car use. Social comparison motives refer to the
possibility to express yourself by using a motor car, and to compare your behavior
with that of others. Social comparison with others may result in feelings of superiority
or inferiority. ‘Social comparison’ is a term very often used in psychology and is
related to what economist describes as ‘status’. In this paper we use the term ‘status’
for all aspects related to relative position of a persons car in the total car fleet or the
relative position within a certain group of people that is of importance for the person.
We realize the social comparison processes will be very complex. For simplicity we
do not discuss this subject extensively but assume that status aspects are relevant for
the choice of the engine, as far as power is concerned (see also Kroon, 1998).
Nevertheless, extra power may be functional, e.g. for people making frequent long
trips on the German motorways, who can then actually reduce travel times. However,
most cars in most Western countries have engines with much more power than
needed, given the characteristics of infrastructure, speed limits and travel distances.
We assume that the increase in power of the car fleet of the past decades has more to
do with relative than with absolute needs.
In short, from psychological literature it can be concluded that social comparison
influences the choice of car. Therefore, besides functional characteristics related to
the transport function, the characteristics of the total car fleet in a country are
important for people’s choice of a car type. Assuming that everyone else drives a VW
5Polo (small car), a  VW Golf (middle-class car) owner might be more satisfied than a
VW Passat (upper-middle class car) owner when everyone else drives a Mercedes or
Jaguar.
5. Status effects as consumption externalities
From a welfare economic perspective, the relative needs and status effects in
consumption described above could be viewed as reflecting a particular type of
market failure, namely consumption externalities. In this section, we provide a
graphical analysis of the welfare economic properties of such consumption
externalities; the next section presents an analytical model. In other words, we will
explore the welfare economic consequences of the psychologists’ conclusion that
social comparison influences the choice of car.
Standard micro-economic models typically assume that an individual’s utility derived
from consumption depends only on the composition and size of the individually
consumed ‘bundle of goods’. This assumption is consistent with the welfare-economic
benchmark of efficient markets. In the event that the utility derived from consumption
also depends directly on the consumption of other agents, free markets will no longer
achieve Pareto-efficient consumption patterns. In this and the next section, we will
present a welfare economic analysis of this type of market failures applied to the
example of ‘status effects’ in car use.
Our analysis links in with the economic literature on consumption interdependencies.
Already in the 19th century, Veblen (1899) considered ‘conspicuous consumption’,
where people like to ‘show off’, by buying goods without any apparent use against a
very high price. Similar to the problem we study below, Frank (1985) focuses on
‘local status’ as it is derived from one’s position in a firm’s income distribution, and
identifies the inefficiencies that follow from the resulting ‘income race’. Stigler and
Becker (1977) consider ‘fashion goods’, and recently, Frijters (1998) considered
fashion cycles in a dynamic setting.
It is important to emphasize that in our analysis the existence of consumption
externalities is taken as given, and that these externalities are presupposed to reflect
status effects. Fully in line with definitions of external effects as given by, for instance,
Baumol and Oates (1988) and Mishan (1971)1, we thus assume that the utility derived
from the use of a certain variant and quantity (typically 0 or 1 on the individual level
for automobiles) of a good partly depends directly on the variants and quantities used
by all other consumers. Consumers then choose quantities and variants which also
depend on consumption patterns of all others. In doing so, each individual consumer
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 Verhoef (1996, p. 12) has formulated these definitions as follows: ‘an external effect exists when an
actor's (the receptor's) utility (or production) function contains a real variable, whose actual value depends
on the behaviour of another actor (the supplier), who does not take this effect of his behaviour into
account in his decision-making process’.
6in turn marginally affects the utility from consumption enjoyed by others, but does not
take these effects into account when deciding on the particular variant and quantity to
be consumed. A consumer simply selects the most preferred vehicle, given the
composition of the total fleet. The individual consumer’s influence is reflected as
being infinitesimally small relative to the size of the market. Note that just as in the
case of congestion externalities, each consumer brings about externalities and suffers
from them. The latter effect is taken into account in individual decision-making; the
former is ignored.
Finally, we emphasize that status effects such as considered here do not require
jealousy to be a relevant factor, in which case consumption externalities would
perhaps not be an appropriate concept to use when studying consumption
interdependencies. In case of jealousy, the utility of the one agent would depend
negatively on the utility enjoyed by another. In our modelling, in contrast, utility of
the one agent depends on the consumption of others, regardless of the utility these
others may enjoy. In other words, an agent in our model will not feel better just
because someone else feels worse. However, the possession of a relatively highly
ranked vehicle does make someone feel better compared to the situation where the
same vehicle is possessed but its relative position has worsened. We thus interpret the
unavoidable effect of one’s own vehicle’s relative ranking on that of others as an
‘unintended side-effect’ of the own vehicle choice (to stick with Mishan’s (1971)
terminology), which is admittedly debatable due to the definitional relation between
one’s own and the others’ vehicles’ relative ranking. Buchanan and Stubblebine
(1962) asserted “that a (Pareto relevant) externality is present when, in competitive
equilibrium, the (marginal) conditions of optimal resource allocation are violated”
(quoted from Baumol and Oates, 1988). According to this somewhat more functional
definition, the interdependencies we study classify immediately as externalities, as will
become clear in the analyses below.
5.1 A simple model with one homogeneous good
The simplest possible example of consumption externalities concerns the case with
one single homogeneous good (good ‘1’), where the utility that a consumer derives
from consumption depends partly on the consumption levels of other consumers (as is
standard practice in partial equilibrium analyses, we implicitly assume that all other
markets operate under first-best conditions). In the case of status goods, perceived
exclusiveness would normally decline when the total consumption in the market
increases. Therefore, the utility derived by an individual from consumption decreases
in the total level of consumption.2 As a consequence, the marginal social benefits
(MSB) of consumption are below the marginal private benefits (MPB), because the
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 A reverse example is where the utility of consumption increases in consumption by other agents. One
example would be the ‘bandwagon effect’, as described by Veblen (1898), where the perceived
attractiveness of a good increases as more people consume it. Another example involves positive network
externalities. Such externalities often occur with access to communication networks (telephone, fax,
email): the more people who can be reached by, for instance, telephone, the more valuable one’s own
connection becomes.
7marginal consumer does not take into account the reduction in welfare (s)he causes
for other users through reduced exclusiveness. Assuming that no other market failures
exist, the free-market equilibrium level of consumption, where MPB equals the
market price, and – by assumption – the marginal social costs (MSC) will then be
excessive from the social perspective because MSB will be below MSC in that
equilibrium. The difference between MPB and MSB can be viewed as negative
marginal external benefits (MEB), so, in fact, as marginal external costs. In contrast
to the standard case, the free market therefore fails to achieve the welfare maximizing
consumption level.
Figure 1. Negative consumption externalities for a homogeneous good
Figure 1 provides an illustration in a standard market diagram. For convenience, we
assume a perfectly elastic supply S, at a price level equal to MSC. The market
demand, D, is identical to marginal private benefits (MPB): the willingness to pay for
the marginal consumer given the consumption of others (‘to the left of this
consumer’). The free-market equilibrium, E, is found where D=S and MPB=MSC.
For simplicity, we assume that all consumers are equally sensitive to the consumption
externality.
Due to this externality, the actual benefits for an arbitrary non-marginal consumer
(any consumer to the left of E) will have become smaller than what they would have
been if this consumer were the marginal consumer himself, which is given by the
D=MPB curve. Instead, the benefits derived from consumption will, for example,
amount to those given by the dotted curve. Note that for each consumption level
considered, we must draw another dotted curve; for graphical clarity only the one
applying to the free market equilibrium is shown. The MPB curve thus overestimates
the consumers’ surplus (the difference between the  ‘monetized’ value attached to
consumption and the market price). Taking the consumption externality into account,
a curve like MSB (below MPB, with an intersection at the vertical axis) represents the
marginal social benefits of consumption. MSB is found by correcting MPB for the
negative welfare effect for all non-marginal consumers; i.e. by considering the
marginal impact on the area as bounded by the vertical axis, the dotted curve and D.
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8The optimum is then found at a lower consumption level O,  where MSB=MSC. This
optimum can be realized by applying a consumption tax T equal to the marginal value
of the externality (MPB–MSB) in the optimum. This ‘exclusiveness tax’ internalizes
the negative effect of one’s own consumption on the well-being of others, and results
in a welfare gain having the size of the shaded triangle. Note that where the
consumption externality does not exist so that MPB=MSB, O and E will coincide,
and the optimal value of T will be zero.
Some further remarks on such a tax can be made. First, the tax is likely to be
progressive, as  higher (lower) status goods are likely to be consumed by higher
(lower) income groups. Secondly, it is not inconceivable that status effects become
more pronounced after introduction of this tax, as the tax itself works as a strong
signal, actually identifying status. However, this may lead to the paradoxical situation
where the local optimum with a tax produces a lower welfare than the no tax
equilibrium – a complication that we will ignore in the remainder of the paper.3
Thirdly, as more goods would become status-sensitive, an increasing tax base is
created, that may reduce the need for using other, distortionary taxes. Last but not
least, it ought to be acknowledged that the measurement and valuation of the
externality – as holds for most external effects – will be extremely difficult. We
therefore emphasize that we are interested primarily in the identification of the case
for regulatory policies, rather than making any definite statements about the empirical
optimal tax levels that may result.
5.2 A model with two product variants
Figure 2 shows the simplest possible example of the case that we actually want to
consider, namely where the consumption externality reflects that the utility from
consumption depends in part on the amounts of different variants of the good
consumed by others. The diagram assumes two variants: a standard good ‘1’, and a
close luxurious variant ‘2’. For graphical clarity, we now ignore consumption
externality within the two variants.
Figure 2. A ‘demand surface’ with consumption externalities in a 2-variant setting
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 In particular, this risk is smaller if differentiated taxes are already in existence, which they are for cars.
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9When the consumption of the luxurious good Q2 increases, the benefits of
consumption of good 1 decrease. This can reflect that the variant 1 is becoming less
attractive, relative to the average product quality (i.e., variants 1 and 2 together). In
the case of automobiles, a smaller vehicle yields smaller benefits when an increasing
number of larger and faster cars use the road. As a result, the demand curve for good
1 shifts down when Q2 increases. In this way, we can construct the three-dimensional
demand surface depicted in Figure 2.
Observe that as a result of the consumption externality, the demand for good 1 at a
given price for good 1 will decrease when Q2 increases. This is shown by the curved
line at P1=MSK1(=40), showing the equilibrium demand for good 1 at a given price
(40) for varying levels of Q2. It is important to distinguish clearly between this
consumption externality (reduced benefits of consuming good 1 because of the
implication that the consumption of good 2 causes the relative quality of good 1 to
decrease), and what could be called ‘normal’ cross-elasticity of demand. In the latter
case, the consumption of good 1 would decrease with an increase in Q2 simply
because those consuming good 2 do no longer prefer to consume good 1 (at least not
in the same quantity), since the goods are close substitutes. However, this would not
affect the benefits that the remaining consumers of good 1 derive from their
consumption. With the consumption externality, in contrast, these consumers do
suffer from a loss in benefits derived from consuming good 1, for the reasons outlined
earlier. Therefore the negative externality represents the negative effect on the
benefits of consuming good 1; the reduced consumption of good 1 is a consequence
of this externality. The difference between the two cases (consumption externalities
versus normal cross-elasticities) is therefore subtle but important. A consequence of
the subtlety is that in reality, it will be difficult to identify statistically the empirical
existence of consumption externalities in a multi-commodity context – the cross
presence of prices in estimated demand functions is certainly not yet a guarantee –
despite, for instance, the evidence from the psychological literature on the possible
relevance of consumption externalities in the market for automobiles. Nevertheless,
given the policy implications, such an identification may be important. In the next
section, we will discuss these policy implications, using an analytical model with three
variants.
6. Welfare aspects of consumption externalities
An important subsequent question is whether the consumption externalities described
above have any policy implications. Should the government intervene in a market
where status externalities are important? The answer in principle is ‘yes’: with
consumption externalities, the free market process will not lead to a Pareto efficient
consumption pattern. To illustrate this, we will now consider a market with three
product variants: low (1), medium (2) and high (3) quality; given the topic of our
paper, this will concern the automobile industry.
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For convenience, we maintain the assumption of a perfectly elastic supply for each
variant, so that market prices P1, P2, and P3 are given. This would be relevant for a
small automobile importing country such as the Netherlands.4 We consider a
generalization of the graphs in Figures 1 and 2, where marginal private benefits will
depend on the consumption of each of the three variants; consumption externalities
may also occur within a variant. We assume that if consumption externalities occur,
an individual’s benefits of consumption increase in the consumption of inferior
qualities, and decrease in the consumption of superior qualities. The consumption
externality within a variant may differ in sign. We assume it to be negative for high
quality cars and positive for low quality cars. These assumptions would reflect the
following type of status effects on consumption: it is attractive to be an exclusive
consumer of a high-end automobile, and particularly unattractive to be one of the few
drivers left with a low-end, poor-quality car. Basically, the assumptions would reflect
an individual’s benefits as being partly dependent on the relative ranking of his/her car
in the total fleet. Because only three variants are considered in the present case, this
approach could be operationalized by assuming that every individual considers him-
or herself to be the median of his/her group. Consistent with this interpretation, we
leave the sign of the externality within the medium quality market ambiguous.
The inverse demand functions for the three variants are again equal to the marginal
private benefits, and can thus be written:
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(keeping the consumption of other variants fixed, the inverse demand functions are
assumed to be downward-sloping to guarantee an equilibrium with fully elastic
supply).
For every unit of a variant consumed, qi with 0<qidQi, the actual willingness to pay in
equilibrium with Q1, Q2 and Q3 will be denoted Bi(qi,Q1,Q2,Q3). Under our
assumptions:
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 One possible extension of the present model would be to endogenize the car suppliers’ behaviour,
assuming an oligopolistic market. We leave this issue aside. The assumption of a competitive supply of
cars allows us to focus on market failures due to consumption externalities and environmental
externalities, in an otherwise first-best world. Nevertheless, the extension would be interesting for future
work, as one relevant question would involve the degree to which ologipolistic suppliers would internalize
status externalities.
11
22
3
2
2
2
1
2
321221222 0,0,0);,,(),,( QqQ
B
Q
B
Q
BQQQDQQQqB dd

!t  
w
w
w
w
w
w (1e)
33
3
3
2
3
1
3
321321333 0,0,0);,,(),,( QqQ
B
Q
B
Q
BQQQDQQQqB ddtt  
w
w
w
w
w
w (1f)
Equations (1d)-(1f) show how the benefits attached to any vehicle of a certain class
vary with marginal changes in total class sizes, and that the willingness to pay for the
marginal vehicle is equal to the monetary value of the benefits attached to that vehicle.
Next, we assume that the three variants may differ with respect to environmental
quality. Specifically, the purchase of a vehicle of quality i will cause environmental
external costs with a value Ei. Note that we assume that the actual use of vehicle after
its purchase is given. In the context of the present exposition, this is a simplifying, but
non-essential, assumption that could easily be relaxed, but one that is less relevant for
the main line of thought. As stated, the product price Pi is treated as a constant,
reflecting a small-country situation5.
We can then write the social surplus, our measure for welfare, as the sum of total
benefits, minus the costs of vehicles, minus environmental costs:
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The first three terms (in integral form) denote the benefits attached to each unit qi
within a specific class (note that the qi’s are the integration variables), given Q1, Q2
and Q3. Note that the total benefits are separable into three type-specific terms,
because in the integral for each type i, only the upper limits for the other two types
(Qj) appear, and not the associated integrating variables (qj). For each (Q1,Q2,Q3),
W(Q1,Q2,Q3) is therefore uniquely defined. We can then determine the necessary first-
order conditions for an optimum by setting the partial derivatives of W with respect to
Q1, Q2 and Q3 equal to zero:
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5
 There is some evidence that car manufacturers tend to ask lower prices for cars in countries were taxes
are higher. As stated, market power and price setting will be ignored in this paper.
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Next we assume that the government can try and achieve this optimum by using
differentiated vehicle taxes Ti. For each class, the market equilibrium will be reached
when the marginal private benefits Di is equal to the price of the vehicle Pi plus the tax
Ti:
D P T1 1 1 0( )    (4a)
D P T2 2 2 0( )    (4b)
D P T3 3 3 0( )    (4c)
By subtracting (4abc) from (3abc), we can finally determine the following optimal
taxes necessary for a social optimum:
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where pos, neg and amb. indicate positive, negative and ambiguously signed terms,
respectively. The tax T3 is the only one to be clearly positive; T2 and T1 have positive
(or ambiguously signed) terms subtracted from a positive tax, and may thus turn out
to be negative (hence: a subsidy).
Regardless of the question on whether luxurious cars cause higher environmental
externalities (we leave the relative size of E1, E2 and E3 undetermined), equations
(5abc) demonstrate that status effects, in the interpretation of consumption
externalities, affect the optimal taxes. In particular, we find a downward adjustment
for low-quality cars, an upward adjustment for high-quality cars, and an ambiguously
signed adjustment for the middle category.
The conclusion is that, from the welfare economic perspective, status effects leading
to consumption externalities will provide a basis for corrective taxation. On the free
market, consumers would inefficiently strongly stimulate each other to purchase more
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luxurious variants.  Corrective taxes may protect consumers against such treadmills.
Certainly, heterogeneity as such would generally still be welfare enhancing: note that
in the optimum, each of the variants will normally still be traded, although the relative
shares will be different. In particular, there will be more lower-class and fewer higher-
class vehicles in the optimum.
7. Effects of a shift towards more fuel-efficient cars on the environment and
welfare: policy conclusions
Two important policy aspects are related to the issues presented in the previous
sections. First, an overall shift to more fuel-efficient cars (that are smaller, weight less
and have less power) may result in only a limited loss of welfare. This is because the
possibilities for people to distinguish from others remain the same and mobility needs
are satisfied (almost) at the same level as without the shift. The reason that this shift is
not be realized by the free market is the result of consumption externalities: the
relatively little decrease in welfare for one individual buying a more fuel-efficient car
will only be realized if all other car owners ‘down-grade’ and buy a more fuel-efficient
car, too. Such an overall down-grading can only be realized through government
policy.
The second aspect is related to the question: which is the first-best policy instrument
to realize the shift to more fuel-efficient cars? Many economists prefer pricing
instruments because - assuming the market works well – only these instruments would
lead to a maximization of welfare. The shift towards more fuel-efficient cars can be
realized by pricing instruments, e.g. by increasing fuel taxes, or differentiation of taxes
on new cars / annual taxes (lower taxes for more fuel-efficient cars). The consumption
externalities discussed above would require the latter type from an efficiency
perspective; environmental externalities, which strongly depend on total kilometrage
driven and fuel used, would typically require the former.
However, to realize a significant shift to more fuel-efficient cars by pricing
instruments, much opposition from society can be expected (Verhoef, 1996).
Regulation may be an alternative. For efficiency reasons, regulations should preferably
be based on sound economic principles. The first option for regulations may be a fee-
bate system. Generally speaking smaller vehicles have a lower status and larger cars
are less energy-efficient. This means that optimal tax differentiation should be greater
than what is suggested by differences in environmental costs alone. Instruments like
fee-bates may then become an attractive policy option (Davis et al., 1995). A fee-bate
is a system where car buyers get a rebate when they buy a car that is more fuel-
efficient than average, and have to pay a fee when they buy a car which is less fuel-
efficient than average. If desired, fee-bate schemes can be designed such that they are
budget neutral from the government’s perspective. Because most countries already
have taxes on cars, the fee-bate system results in lower (but still positive) taxes for
fuel efficient cars and additional taxes for cars with a relatively high fuel consumption
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level. In case of no taxes on cars such budget-neutrality may induce inefficiencies
when the scheme is intended to regulate external costs such as environmental
pollution: ideally, all polluters should face a positive tax. However, for the
consumption externality considered above, budget-neutral fee-bates may be (nearly)
optimal, as we found a subsidy for low-end cars and a tax for high-end cars. Finally,
note that physical regulations (like prohibition of certain types of cars) will normally
be less efficient than price instruments. To see why, it is sufficient to observe that in
the optimum, all types of cars may still be used, albeit in different proportions.
Apart from the fee-bates we suggest a second possibility: tradeable permits.
Experience with the American CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) standards,
first introduced in 1978, shows them to be a possibly attractive option. All
manufacturers are subject to standards for the average fuel economy of all the cars
they sell in a certain year. Manufacturers who do exceed the standards have to pay
(Dings and Janse, 1996). The CAFE standards between 1975 and 1995 were
especially influential in decreasing the fuel use of the American car fleet by almost
40% per kilometre (Davis, 1997). This decrease was realized mainly in the period up
to 1983; after this the standards have hardly been tightened. Verhoef et al. (1997)
give an overview of possible and current use of tradeable permits related to road
transport externalities.
The shift to more fuel-efficient cars may be realized by a system in which every
manufacturer or importer selling cars in a certain country has to meet a certain fuel-
use standard for all cars sold in a certain year. ‘Permits’ can be made tradeable: a
manufacturer or importer whose average is below the standard can sell the difference
(between standards and realization) to a manufacturer or importer who can then sell
cars that (on average) do not meet the standard. Such a system can be fiscally neutral
and may improve the fleets energy efficiency without a (great) loss in welfare but,
with the related environmental advantages.
8. Conclusions
Once a certain average per capita income is achieved in a country, further increases in
average income do not lead to an increase in happiness. This average income level is
much lower than current average incomes in Western countries. An important reason
for these further increases in income not improving happiness might be that additional
income will be spent mainly on goods that fulfill relative needs (and are related to
status / social comparison). A shift to more fuel-efficient cars (i.e. smaller cars with
less power) may result in only a limited reduction in ‘happiness’ when this shift does
not decrease possibilities to satisfy status related needs, and will not decrease the
fulfillment of mobility needs.
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The satisfaction of relative needs results in market inefficiencies, because consumption
externalities exist. Therefore, a welfare-economic basis for (regulation) policies exists,
with the aim to make lower-status goods more attractive and higher status goods less
so. Possible instruments for such a policy, with a further derived benefit of improving
a car fleet’s fuel efficiency, are price increases, fee-bates and tradeable permits. To
achieve a significant increase in the fuel efficiency of a county’s car fleet through
pricing policies, huge price increases may be needed. As acceptance of price increases
as a policy instrument is low, fee-bates and tradeable permits may be more preferable
instruments. Both can be made fiscal-neutral and are therefore likely to meet lower
resistance from society.
Finally, we emphasize that statistical difficulties may seriously hinder or even prevent
the empirical assessment of the (marginal) relevance of the consumption externalities
we considered. Although the psychological literature we reviewed in Section 4
supports the hypothesis that such externalities may be important in reality, it remains
to be seen whether optimal prices could ever be assessed. Our analysis only aims to
show that at least from a theoretical perspective, attempts to do so might be
worthwhile, as society as a whole would eventually be better off after internalizing
such externalities.
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